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Nancy Cartwright
A Question of Nonsense
1. Introduction
As a philosopher of science I often feel compelled to teach about scientific 
realism. When I have done so, my best reconstruction of the issue 
formulates the central question this way: When are we rationally warranted 
in accepting a scientific theory? I have trouble teaching scientific realism 
however, and Edna’s ideas, about picking and choosing (Ullmann-Margalit 
and Morgenbesser 1977, Ullmann-Margalit 2006a), and more lately the 
wonderful account of the interweaving that turns facts into evidence relative 
to the choice of other facts as evidence that we find in Out of the Cave 
(Ullmann-Margalit 2006b) have helped me figure out why. The reason is that 
the central question is, I think, nonsense. There are five major words in this 
question and every one of them is problematic. ‘When are
•	 We
•	 Rationally
•	 Warranted
•	 In	accepting
•	 A	scientific	theory?’
The issue of picking, or as I have been inclined to call it more graphically 
following Otto Neurath, plumping, has been with me for decades. As I shall 
explain, Out of the Cave has mattered to my recent efforts to develop a 
theory of evidence. Some people might assimilate evidence to warrant for 
acceptance, which I just said makes no sense. This assimilation, I argue, 
is a mistake. A theory of evidence asks, under what conditions does one 
fact speak for the truth of another? This endeavour is quite distinct from 
theory of knowledge, which is concerned with warrant, with justification for 
us. I am particularly concerned to keep them apart because I, unlike almost 
all other philosophers, do not believe in theory of knowledge, at least not 
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where I work: in the philosophy of science. There’s no such thing as ‘theory 
of scientific knowledge’, no theory to address the question: When are we 
rationally warranted in accepting a scientific theory? That’s because, as I 
said, I think there is not a single concept in this question that makes sense 
in real science. 
So, let’s have a look.
2. What’s Wrong with the Question?
Scientific theory. For a long time philosophers of science have tried 
to axiomatize their favourite ‘scientific theories’, and in their own way 
scientists, especially physicists, have joined in this enterprise. Also for a 
good while now we in philosophy have debated the syntactic versus the 
semantic view of theories. Is a theory a set of claims that are supposed to be 
true of the world – in particular a small set of simple elegant general claims? 
Or is it instead a set of universal models that are supposed to map onto the 
world in some designated way? So we talk all the time about theory. But 
where in science is this special thing called ‘theory’?
The last two decades of emphasis in Science Studies on scientific 
practice as opposed to scientific theory have underlined that there are a vast 
number of scientific practices that make up science, including classifying, 
experimenting, measuring, settling on standards, designing, and building 
machines – as in machine physics – and technology – like the laser or Lord 
Kelvin’s Atlantic cable – constructing models and blueprints for specific 
cases, creating new substances and materials and new ways to change the 
world – which contemporary genetics witnesses repeatedly – developing 
new bits of mathematics, discovering, creating, and stabilising phenomena, 
calculating, inferring, making, refining and defending very specific concrete 
claims about specific situations and specific systems, providing a vast 
number of low level ceteris paribus laws, and so forth.
Scientific knowledge is reflected and encoded in all of these when 
carried out successfully. And, as I have argued for a long time, little 
of this knowledge – if any – is recorded, even in a very abstract way, in 
what gets labelled ‘scientific theory’ when we talk, say, about the semantic 
versus the syntactic view of theories. Some, though, is recorded in theories 
as understood through practice and by practitioners. It is not just that 
procedures and applications are necessary in addition to laws and theories. It 
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is the procedures and applications that give content to theoretical claims and 
laws. Without the procedures and applications, the claims are mere words, 
which is a well-known theme of Thomas Kuhn: 
Consider, for a single example, the quite large and diverse community constituted 
by all physical scientists. Each member of that group today is taught the laws of, 
say, quantum mechanics, and most of them employ these laws at some point in their 
research or teaching. But they do not all learn the same applications of these laws, 
and they are not therefore all affected in the same ways by changes in quantum 
mechanical practice. On the road to professional specialization, a few physical 
scientists encounter only the basic principles of quantum mechanics. Others study 
in detail the paradigm applications of these principles to chemistry, still others to 
the physics of the solid state, and so on. What quantum mechanics means to each of 
them depends on what courses he has had, what texts he has read, and which journals 
he studies. [...] In short, though quantum mechanics (or Newtonian dynamics, or 
electromagnetic theory) is a paradigm for many scientific groups, it is not the same 
paradigm for all. (Kuhn 1962, 49–50)
These ideas are further developed in the works of Peter Galison that 
argues that different scientific groups imbed what can seem the same 
concepts in very different networks of practice and inference that thus 
embody different understandings. Communication between the groups with 
their different ‘thick’ understandings via stripped down ‘pidgin’ languages 
is not sufficient to do the tasks of any of the separate groups that speak them 
(Galison 1997).
I back up my scepticism about theory by a robust empiricism. The claims 
of science must be supported – in detail – by empirical facts. This support 
is witnessed by success in predicting and intervening precisely in the world. 
If so, what is supported then are claims as interpreted through the network 
of concrete assumptions and practices that afford the successful predictions 
and interventions. A very great number of claims are thus supported. But 
this wealth of very specific practice-interpreted claims are not in any way 
expressed or summarized by the axioms of theory, even if we allow for a 
great deal of adjustment in trying to get the summary to fit. 
Who is we? Once it is acknowledged that,
•	 scientific	knowledge	is	recorded	in	practices	and	machines	as	well	as	
in words, 
•	 the	kinds	of	claims	that	are	empirically	supported	are	thickly	interpreted	
through these practices, and
•	 there	are	very	great	differences	in	practice,
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then the ‘we’ of ‘When are we rationally justified...?’ shatters into thousands 
of pieces. There are paradigms within paradigms within paradigms. 
Who then is the ‘we’ of concern in the question ‘When are we justified 
in accepting a scientific claim?’ I want to point out that the ‘we’s’ divide not 
only according to the network of paradigm practices and assumptions that 
provide a proper interpretation for the claim, but according to the purpose to 
which the claim will be put. I will tackle this issue simultaneously with the 
issue of acceptance and justification. But first – because I want to get you 
to think about plumping, or to use Edna’s word, picking – I should like to 
discuss the rational of ‘rational acceptance’.
Rational choice among thickly interpreted scientific claims: This we 
know is a vexed issue. From Otto Neurath, Thomas Kuhn, Paul Feyerabend, 
Imre Lakatos, and a great many others we have learned that there are no 
paradigm-independent standards from which to judge different paradigms. 
And even if we choose to operate always within a paradigm, what are 
taken to be the facts will always underdetermine any interesting scientific 
claims. To fix this problem there has been much talk of making decisions 
by resort to special ‘virtues’ that a theory or a hypothesis might have, like 
accuracy, consistency, scope, simplicity, production of novel predictions, 
and fruitfulness. The trouble is, these virtues are not up to the job. First, 
they are too vague to fix real choices; second, their verdicts often conflict; 
third, it is hard to see why if truth is the aim, they are virtues; fourth, the 
set seems arbitrary. Why focus on these rather than, for instance, Helen 
Longino’s (1995) list that includes ontological heterogeneity, mutuality 
of interaction, applicability to human needs, and diffusion of power? 
So neither the facts nor the virtues can tell us what is the best choice to 
make.
Edna and Sidney Morgenbesser (1977) discussed issues like this with 
respect to rational choice theory and that is where I first learned about 
picking. In their case, rational choice was to be grounded in preferences. But, 
just as with facts and virtues in the case of arguments for scientific claims, 
sometimes preferences are not up to the job. They leave it open what the 
better choice is. Still we often must come to a decision. What do we do? We 
just decide. That’s what Edna and Morgenbesser called picking. 
Edna continued throughout her career to be concerned about picking and 
what happens in “the realm of decisions without preferences” (Ullmann-
Margalit 2006a, 171). For instance:
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One chooses for reasons; one picks when reasons cannot prevail. This happens when 
the alternatives are entirely symmetrical (or incommensurate). But reasons also fail 
to prevail when we come to the very end of the chain of reasons, when we run out of 
reasons altogether. If you choose to do X for reason A and, asked to justify A, you cite 
B and then you give C as your reason for B and so on, you eventually reach the very 
bottom, the substratum of all your reasons. (Ibid., italics added)
What Edna takes to be true for reasons to do X is equally true for arguments 
that speak for the truth of a scientific claim. The arguments require premises. 
And arguments for the premises require further premises. Eventually we 
choose not to pursue the arguments further. We rest content with where 
we stop, at least for the nonce. When it comes to science, it is widely 
acknowledged that there are no sure ways to build a case for our claims, 
and the same goes for the methods we might use to convince ourselves that 
one alternative is better than another. What seems hard to admit is the kind 
of voluntarism that follows in train, endorsed by Bas van Fraassen, Otto 
Neurath, me, and Edna when she speaks of decisions where “reasons cannot 
prevail” (2006a, 171). What we do then – all that’s left to do – is to pick, or 
as Otto Neurath put it: we plump.
So now let us think about acceptance and justification for it.
Acceptance. In a very nice 1953 paper, rejecting the value-free ideal and 
arguing that values should enter science that Heather Douglas has brought 
back	to	our	attention,	Richard	Rudner	begins	his	case	with	the	claim	that	part	
of	a	scientist’s	job	is	to	accept	or	reject	hypotheses.	I	disagree	with	Rudner’s	
starting premise, though not with his conclusion.
I do not think the common philosophical notion of ‘acceptance’ generally 
has any referent; and when acceptance goes, justification becomes essentially 
value infused, as it is throughout life. There are a very great many ways 
one can put a scientific claim to use. You can use it as an assumption in a 
blueprint to build a bridge or a laser or a back-to-work policy; as part of the 
basis for a new research endeavour; to predict the course of a cannonball or 
an	accelerated	particle	at	the	large	hadron	collider	in	CERN;	you	can	write	it	 
in a textbook – and that for school pupils, undergraduates, post graduates, …; 
sign off on a consensus report about climate change or drug abuse policies 
that contains it; give a Nobel Prize to the person who envisioned it or 
evidenced it; vote in favour of an NSF grant for a young scientist to develop 
its ideas or to run an experiment to test it or to gather data to measure one of 
the parameters in it; and so forth. 
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These are all action descriptions with clear referents. But where is this 
thing called ‘acceptance’? Perhaps I have a peculiar phenomenology but I 
find nothing in either my inner or my outer life that corresponds to it. Nor 
do I understand it sociologically. Is it, as in Jeremiah 31.33, to ‘have the 
law inscribed in your inward heart’? I do not deny that special situations 
can create a reference in special cases. Marrano Jews perhaps could do and 
say exactly what Christians did even when talking most intimately among 
themselves and yet be in a state properly described as having the law of the 
God of Israel inscribed in their inward hearts. Perhaps here justification for 
writing something in our heart of hearts is an entirely personal matter. It may 
have no implications outside one’s own welfare and sense of self-respect. 
But these situations – where ‘acceptance’ has a clear meaning and where 
whatever it is one is supposed to be doing in ‘accepting’ has implications 
only for oneself – are not typical, and they are not salient for good scientific 
practice.
There is one sense of acceptance by particular communities that I do see 
instantiated – and that we must be wary of – because it implicates the welfare 
of others. That is, treating scientific claims like a well-tested product that 
you – the scientific community in question – put on a shelf in a warehouse 
for others to take off the shelf and put to use. My worries start when claims 
are put on warehouse shelves without clear instructions for use. As I have 
rehearsed: It is not strings of words or symbols with what Paul Grice would 
have called their ‘literal meaning’ that are tested in science. What the use 
of a claim in successful prediction, planning, and technology supports is 
that claim as interpreted through the dense web of techniques and practices 
which afford those successful predictions and uses. That empirical support 
can flow only to new predictions and uses which follow from the claim as 
thus interpreted.
Think about problem sets in textbooks. These both help provide not only 
content to the claims in the text but also clear paradigms of use. And as 
students get closer and closer to actual use as engineers, experimenters, lab 
technicians, doctors, options pricers, and the like, both the claims and the 
problems become more complex. These are cases where instructions for use 
are built into the product that is put on the warehouse shelves. Moreover, we 
will find a good many products that may at the loosest level of description 
look alike – they are on the shelves housing ‘Ohm’s law’ for instance – but 
these products are in fact highly differentiated.
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The area I’ve been working in recently – evidence-based policy – is one 
where these lessons about thick interpretation, and the cautions which follow 
about putting scientific claims ‘on the shelf’ where they may to be taken 
down to use in other ‘thick’ contexts, where they will in fact amount to a 
different claim, are largely ignored. There are a number of distinguished 
vetting agencies, which police evidence claims about policy efficacy: the 
Cochrane Collaboration for medicine and the Campbell Collaboration for 
social policy, for instance, or the US Department of Education’s What Works 
Clearinghouse. These agencies check carefully that claims of policy efficacy 
are well supported by rigorous well-conducted studies, where an efficacy 
claim is a claim that the policy caused a targeted result in the study setting. 
Since these are causal claims, their gold standard for a top ranking – 1 in a 
scale	of	1	to	4	say	–	is	the	randomised	controlled	trial	(RCT).
So far so good. It is the next steps that are egregious, steps in which the 
label ‘top ranked’ slips from a specific efficacy claim to the policy itself. The 
very top rank, say 1**, is given when there are a number of well-supported 
efficacy claims about the same policy or a meta-analysis of studies about 
the same policy that treats the separate study populations as if they were 
drawn from one large sample. Policies associated with high rankings are 
then warehoused in special sites, like the What Works Clearing House or 
the seven What Works Centres on separate topics from crime to aging to 
education now being established in the UK; and policy makers mandated 
to pursue evidence-based policy are told to go to those sites to choose their 
policies if at all possible.
So here we have a case that may appropriately be labelled ‘acceptance’. 
The vetting agency has accepted the claims it gives a high rank to (or 
probably better, for those who believe in degrees of acceptance, has accepted 
them to a high degree). The acceptance is witnessed by their recommending 
these claims for use by practitioners not able to judge the quality of the 
products themselves. But there is no clarity about:
•	 What	the	claims	are.	
•	 What	the	instructions	for	use	are.	
•	 How	 the	 uses	 to	which	 they	might	 be	 put	 can	 be	warranted	 by	 the	
content of the claims. 
The	single	efficacy	claim	ranked	1	on	account	of	the	good	RCT	has	clear	
content: this policy produced the targeted effect in at least some units in the 
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study population. What about 1**? The methodology supports ‘This policy 
produced the targeted effect in some individuals in some number of different 
settings’. But the advice to policy consumers to choose policies with 1** 
rankings suggests that the claim is ‘This policy produces the targeted 
effect in most settings’. Or ‘This policy will produce the targeted effect in 
your setting’. Though sometimes there’s a warning label, as with the U.S. 
Department of Education website: ‘Don’t buy this policy if your setting is 
too different from the study settings’. 
Here we might reasonably talk of ‘acceptance’ without asking about 
what is written in the inner heart. The warehouse vetters accept the 1 or 
1** claims in the sense that they in good faith recommend them to non-
expert users. But it is, I would judge, not justified acceptance, and not just 
because in the end the vetters have to plump. I am thus not concerned with 
rational justification, which is, I argue, anyway an empty notion, but with 
justification, simply justification.
Justification. My worries on this last issue follow the lead of Amartya 
Sen and Bernard Williams. In a 1983 article, Sen distinguished between the 
truth of scientific claims and the goodness of scientific accounts on the one 
hand and the goodness of actions on the other. The latter, being actions, are 
subject to moral scrutiny since all actions are subject to moral scrutiny. Sen 
says:
The problem here isn’t fearing that scientific action might be value-loaded, but 
fearing that it might not. Value-loading here is not so much a right as a duty. An 
action that is contrary to his or her own values [...] remains pernicious in terms of 
his or her own values, even if it happens to be related to science. (1983, 104, italics 
original)
So all those actions involving scientific claims that I described above when 
discussing acceptance: “You can use it … to build a bridge; … or for a new 
research endeavour; to predict the course of a cannonball; … or write it in 
a textbook; … sign off on a consensus report; … give a Nobel Prize to the 
person who envisioned it;… vote in favour of a National Science Foundation 
grant to develop it...; and so forth” – all of these are actions and thus can 
call for justification – real justification. The justification for any particular 
use will involve genuine – quite ordinary – issues, which blend together 
questions of evidence, expertise, what can be taken as common knowledge, 
what is morally, socially, culturally acceptable, various benefits to various 
parties, what the costs are, what the costs of type 1 versus type 2 errors are, 
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and so forth: the usual ingredients of practical reasoning about what one 
ought to do.
Naturally issues of truth and evidence enter. But, recall Bernard Williams 
on morally thick descriptions such as treachery, promise, brutality, and 
courage: they are Janus-faced, looking to the world on one side and to issues 
of praise and blame on the other. As Williams puts it, they are “at the same 
time world-guided and action-guiding” (Williams 1986, 141). But they do 
not divide into two parts, glued together: matters of fact and matters of value. 
So too with actions involving scientific claims. 
Consider: You are about to endorse a claim to a graduate student whom 
you know is readily influenced by you and is considering taking a position 
in a research group that uses this claim as a central pillar for its research. 
Before endorsing this claim in these circumstances, you should consider the 
evidence for it. You should also consider the abilities of the research team that 
propose to follow it up, the opinion of your colleagues about the evidence 
and what it shows, the talents of the student, the chances that she will end 
up with publishable papers even if the research program does not produce 
its promised results, and so forth. These issues will not separate nicely, as 
we might have hoped, to afford a two-stage deliberation: first wear your 
scientist’s hat to estimate the degree to which you are justified in ‘accepting’ 
the claim; then consider how justified you are in using a claim with that 
degree	of	warrant	in	the	way	proposed.	Rather	you	must	consider	the	issues	
all together in one fell swoop. And you should consider them. What you say 
to the student matters to her life, so you should take pains to ensure that what 
you do is justified. But that is not an exclusively scientific enterprise.
Interim conclusion.	Returning	at	last	to	my	opening	concern,	the	central	
question of scientific realism: ‘When are we rationally justified in accepting 
a scientific theory?’ I conclude from these considerations that this question 
does not make sense. And providing rational justification for acceptance is 
not something that scientists should attempt to engage in.
Evidence and evaluation. BUT, there is something clearly at the core of 
science that this activity can be mistaken for, which is: producing evidence 
for scientific claims and producing reasons that it is evidence – just the kind 
of thing that Edna explores so beautifully in Out of the Cave. I advocate 
a stark theory of evidence, the Argument Theory. An empirical claim e is 
evidence for an empirical hypothesis h just in case e is an essential premise 
in a sound argument for h, that is, a valid argument with true premises.
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My	colleague	Julian	Reiss	defends	an	alternative	theory	of	evidence.	He	
dislikes the Argument Theory because, he claims, it is not a theory of evidence 
for us (Personal communication). He is here criticising me on my very own 
grounds – hoist on my own petard. I regularly argue that metaphysics and 
methods must march hand-in-hand. It is a poor analysis of what something 
is – say, evidence, causality, the electron, malaria – if the analysis leaves 
it mysterious why our best methods for diagnosing whether something is 
evidence or an electron or a case of malaria should work. 
Sherrilyn	Roush	has	this	worry	too:
I don’t see how we could use [the definition from the Argument Theory] to figure 
out when we can use a claim as evidence then, because it doesn’t give us any 
guidance. Even if this tells us the conditions that obtain when something is evidence, 
it doesn’t tell us anything about how to tell when those conditions do apply. (Personal 
communication, August 2012)
This objection seems to me misplaced. To figure out whether e is evidence for 
h, the Argument Theory guides you to look for good arguments connecting 
e and h. Of course it doesn’t tell you how to tell if an argument is good. But 
that’s not in its job description. Coming up with an argument is part of the 
ordinary normal science job of scientific discovery. To check that it is valid, 
perhaps one needs a good logician or a good mathematician. To tell if the 
premises are true, we employ the normal methods available in the paradigm 
in which we work for assessing the kinds of claims the premises make.
There is another version of the objection though that can seem to have 
more	bite.	We	want,	Roush	urges,	“some	guidelines	for	dealing	with	our	lack	
of the kinds of Arguments we seek. How confident should we be, given the 
very partial information that we have, that there is a sound, valid argument 
from [e] to [h], and why?” (Personal communication, August 2012)
My first remark on this is that there is no should about it. Following the 
point of view I have been developing here, there is no such thing as ‘rational 
warrant for accepting’ a scientific claim, even if we restrict attention to 
claims thickly interpreted by the practices in which they are imbedded. 
Roush	herself,	like	many	philosophers	engaged	in	debates	about	statistical	
inference or confirmation theory, does not like the idea of acceptance 
either.	And	for	good	reason.	Recall	that	at	the	conclusion	of	my	discussion	
of rational choice, I urged, with Neurath, van Fraassen, and Edna in cases 
where preferences won’t suffice, that in the end, the individual must plump. 
Here	is	what	Roush	thinks	about	that:
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This is where a Bayesian has a strength because, since you never have complete 
evidence from which the conclusion follows deductively, you never plunge but only 
apportion confidence to the strength of your evidence, and acting on that confidence/
degree of belief retains awareness of the imperfection of your epistemic situation by 
the fact that you (the rational subject) will put less stake on a [hypothesis] that you 
have less evidence for. (Personal communication, August 2012)
This looks again like a case of being hoist on my own petard since I am 
always urging, especially in advice about evidence-based policy, that when 
we	act,	we	should	generally	hedge	our	bets	heavily.	Roush	puts	very	directly	
the objection that a very great many people will have to the Argument Theory 
of evidence: that it provides no purchase for degrees of support.
I agree that it does not. But I do not take that to be a problem. I have 
argued that we should not be trying to answer the question ‘When are we 
warranted in accepting a scientific claim?’ Equally we should not be trying to 
answer the question, ‘What degree of confidence are we rationally warranted 
to have in a scientific claim?’ If the other premises of a valid argument from 
e to h are true, e partly supports h. If they are not, e does not partly support h. 
There’s no fact of nature, among the premises, which does the heavy lifting. 
They must all be true or no lifting is done at all.
There is no such thing as ‘the degree of confidence I am entitled to have 
in h.’ As a scientist, if I want to assess the truth of a novel hypothesis that is 
not already a part of the canon, I gather evidence for it and I reason about it. 
If I want to assess whether a result I have obtained – e – really is evidence 
for the hypothesis – h, I gather more evidence and do more reasoning. So: 
I have measured the deflection of a particle from a straight line trajectory 
in an electromagnetic field. Is my result, call it e again, evidence about h, 
the charge of the particle? To address that question, I turn to Maxwell’s 
electromagnetic theory; I double-check that my measurements of the 
electromagnetic field strength are correct as well as my identification of the 
particle’s mass; I check that the apparatus is working as I expect; and I go 
back over my calculations to see that I have made no misstep. Perhaps I 
also check that my understanding is right that Maxwell’s theory coupled 
with Newton’s does imply that the deflection in the trajectory is a function 
of the particle’s charge. That is how I defend my claim that the deflection is 
evidence for the charge. Then in the end, if the situation calls for me to use 
my result as the correct charge, I plump. My plumping may be justified and 
it may not be, given the situation and the use to which I am putting my result. 
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But that is an ordinary matter of practical/moral justification that we might 
face with respect to any act we perform.
Maybe I do not have to plump for h. Perhaps we are about to do a cost-
benefit analysis and all it takes is my estimate of the chance that h is true. That 
is	the	happier	situation	that	Roush	envisages.	And	it	is	the	reply	that	Richard	
Jeffrey (1956)	gave	 to	Richard	Rudner	 (1953).	Rudner	 argued	 that	values	
necessarily enter science at the stage when the scientist accepts a hypothesis: 
If there are foreseeable heavily negative consequences from accepting 
the hypothesis if it is false, the scientist must have a far higher degree of 
confidence	 before	 accepting	 it.	 In	 Sen’s	 terms,	 it	 seems	 that	Rudner	 saw	
‘accepting’ as an action that the scientist undertakes in a specific situation 
and as an action, it may call for justification – real moral justification. Jeffrey 
replied that it was not the job of the scientist to accept or reject claims but 
merely to put probabilities on them.
I agree with the first part of Jeffrey’s claim. It is not the job of the scientist 
to accept claims since this notion of acceptance does not have any proper 
application in science. But I reject the second part. Suppose Jeffrey is talking 
about assigning objective probabilities for the hypothesis (if there are any 
such things). In that case the scientist is just back in the normal science 
project of investigating an empirical hypothesis – that P(h) = X – and there 
is no more call for accepting this empirical claim than for accepting h. 
Though of course there may be many actions that the scientist is called upon 
to engage in that involve this claim in important ways; and as actions, they 
may call for justification… again, real practical justification.
There is another problem that arises from the Argument Theory, which 
I urge more sympathy with than with its failure to accord degrees of 
confidence we are entitled to have. This is the problem of recognizing that 
something is or is not evidence for a hypothesis. I urge more sympathy for 
this problem because whether something is evidence or not can play a role 
both in assessing the truth of the hypothesis and in justifying us in many of 
the activities we might undertake involving that hypothesis, like assuming it 
in building a bridge or funding more research for a program growing out of 
it. The problem arises because on the Argument Theory, evidence is a 3-place 
relation, e is evidence for h relative to a good argument for h in which e plays 
an essential role. This means that whether a given fact is evidence or not is 
conditional on the other premises, each of which in turn is itself evidence 
on the Argument Theory – but only relative to e’s being evidence. If e is 
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not evidence, then they are not either (or at least that is not secured by the 
argument in view), but e cannot be evidence unless they are. 
This is a problem for us, but not I think an objection. It is what evidencing 
looks like in real cases. I first saw this clearly in grappling with Edna’s Out of 
the Cave. There we see that different hypotheses about the Dead Sea Scrolls 
and the nearby settlement at Qumran are supported by different complex 
narratives. Two important features of these narratives stand out. First is how 
compelling they are; should they be true, they almost force their conclusions 
– as in a good argument. Second, from the point of view of one narrative, 
most of the facts adduced as evidence in the others are irrelevant – they only 
make a difference to the case given the story we are already in the midst of. 
If the Qumran site was the setting of a military fortress then the fact that it is 
two kilometres from the place where the scrolls were located has no bearing 
at all on whether the scrolls are Essene or not.
One can assimilate this to a well-known fact that we teach undergraduates 
in our philosophy of science classes under the heading ‘Duhem-Quine 
holism’. Single hypotheses are seldom testable in isolation. Generally it takes 
a whole set of claims to deduce an observable consequence and should that 
consequence not obtain, it can be the fault of one of the ‘auxiliary’ hypotheses 
rather than of the hypothesis we hope to test. Put this way, this seems to be 
a fact about hypotheses and how secure they can be. Quite possibly I have 
been slower than others to see that this way of looking at Duhem-Quine 
holism can be turned upside down. It is equally about what is and what is 
not evidence. The deduced consequence is evidence only on condition the 
‘auxiliaries’ are true. Immediately this makes evidence a 3-place relation, 
contrary to many accounts, from Peter Achinstein’s in which the essential 
criterion is that e be explanatorily relevant to h, which Achinstein seems to 
treat as 2-place, to various probabilistic accounts that build from 2-place 
conditional probabilities, like P(e|h), P(h|e), P(h’|e) for some alternative 
h’ ≠	h, and P(e|h’).
But I did not start by turning Duhem-Quine wholism on its head. I started 
with Out of the Cave and its thick narratives of interwoven strands each of 
which leads to the hypothesis only because the others do so as well; where 
without the rest of the story, the separate pieces have no bearing on the final 
conclusion – they are just dangling odd facts that may or may not be of 
interest on their own to someone or for some purpose, some purpose other 
than speaking to the truth of the hypothesis. What I took away from Edna’s 
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book then were two related insights. The status of any one fact as evidence 
depends on the evidential status of a host of other facts, and taken all together 
what counts as evidence must be able to shape itself into a good argument: 
if the rest of the facts aren’t true that could flesh out the narrative to compel 
the conclusion, the facts we have gathered do not bear one way or another on 
the truth of that conclusion. 
3. Conclusion
Whether we are scientists or not, or ‘acting in the role of scientist’ or not, we 
are responsible for what we say and what we do, so we may need justification 
for that because what we say and do can affect our own welfare and the 
welfare of others. Apart from that what we believe is a matter that hardly 
invites justification, unless God is looking into our inner hearts to judge us 
by what is found there. So do not worry about ‘warrant for belief’. 
But sometimes we are in the business of assessing the truth of a claim. In 
that case, evidence can help: facts that speak for the truth of a claim. Evidence 
for a claim, I have maintained, are facts that play an essential role in a good 
argument for that claim. And the better the evidence for the premises of that 
argument and the better the arguments for the premises in the premises, the 
better off we are at our enterprise. But eventually we have to pick, to plump.
I say that there is no single ‘we’ in ‘we accept’ a scientific claim nor 
is there any sense to ‘accept’. Okay then, one may object, why should 
non-experts aim to do anything about anthropogenic climate change? The 
standard answer is because the scientific community accepts that it is real 
and that it will be a disaster, which uses just those concepts I warn against.
I think they should because there is good evidence that anthropogenic 
climate change is real and that it will lead to disaster; because most of us 
reading this are able to do some thing or other, if only to vote, to improve 
matters; and because we are most of us, ceteris paribus, not justified in not 
thus acting. This verdict comes in part from plumping for the truth of the 
claim that the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) is likely 
to have got it right. And in part because the causality claim is in a pidgin 
we all can speak and even within that pidgin and the thin meanings of the 
concepts there, disaster ensues from business as usual. What specifically to 
do about building seawalls in Brighton or maintaining green taxes on energy 
providers in the UK is, though, a matter that can only be seriously investigated 
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using thick concepts supported by networks of small communities speaking 
their own thick languages.
Edna has taught us that sometimes we need to plump, something many 
would prefer to avoid because we feel justified when decisions are dictated 
by rules of rationality. Plumping is an action, though, and can affect others. 
So where we come down on the likelihood that the IPCC has got it right can 
call for serious justification. 
University of Durham
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